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FRA UDULENT CONVEYANCES
dealing with an individual. It does, however, give the individual substan-
tial opportunities to assure the accuracy of the information and to be
compensated when harmed by inaccurate information. The FCRA also
represents a major shift in policy with respect to credit reporting, and
it offers the courts an opportunity to re-evaluate the law applied to
credit reporting agencies and to make such adjustments as may be found
to be beneficial.
GEORGE S. KING, JR.
The Law of Fraudulent Conveyances in North Carolina: An Analysis and
Comparison with the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act
INTRODUCTION
For centuries the law in most civilized countries has limited the
right of an individual freely to dispose of his property if such disposition
adversely affects the rights of creditors. In the Anglo-American context
this law, termed the law of fraudulent conveyances, has always occupied
a prominent place in the realm of property, principally because the
protection of creditors has been essential for the development and pres-
ervation of the English and American economic systems. Generally, any
conveyance or transfer by a debtor that lessens the fund from which his
creditors can expect to be paid may have a tendency to hinder or delay
them and is subject to being treated as fraudulent.' The conditions under
which such a conveyance or transfer can be set aside are the focal area
for the law of fraudulent conveyances.
Common law principles of fraudulent conveyances were first seen
in statutory form as early as 1570 in the Statute of 13 Elizabeth.' This
statute was designed to prevent creditors from being defeated or delayed
by a debtor's conveyance of land or personalty. To this end, it applied
to all transfers made with actual intent to defraud and enabled a creditor
of the debtor to void the transfer unless the rights of a bona fide pur-
chaser would be thereby affected. 13 Elizabeth protected not only the
interests of creditors who had claims against the transferor at the time
of transfer but also the interests of persons who subsequently became
O'Daniel v. Crawford, 15 N.C. 197, 205-06 (1833).
2An Act Against Fraudulent Deeds, Alienations, & Conreyances, 13 Eliz., c. 5, §§ 1-6, at 268
(1570).
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creditors. The later Statute of 27 Elizabeth3 extended protection to
subsequent purchasers of land.4
Many American jurisdictions, including North Carolina, have
adopted these Elizabethan statutes on fraudulent conveyances with only
slight alterations. In North Carolina, section 39-155 of the General
Statutes represents essentially a re-enactment of 13 Elizabeth' with the
deletion of a clause protecting the rights of bona fide purchasers. Such
protection for bona fide purchasers is provided, however, by section 39-
191 of the General Statutes. Section 39-161 is modeled after 27 Elizabeth
'An Act Against Covinous and Fraudulent Conveyances, 27 Eliz., c. 4, § 2, at 356 (1585).
'Garrison v. Brice, 48 N.C. 85, 86 (1855).
5N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-15 (1966) provides:
For avoiding and abolishing feigned, covinous and fraudulent gifts, grants, alienations,
conveyances, bonds, suits, judgments and executions, as well of lands and tenements as
of goods and chattels, which may be contrived and devised of fraud, to the purpose and
intent to delay, hinder and defraud creditors and others of their just and lawful actions
and debts, every gift, grant, alienation, bargain and conveyance of lands, tenements and
hereditaments, goods and chattels, by writing or otherwise, and every bond, suit, judg-
ment and execution, at any time had or made, to or for any intent or purpose last before
declared and expressed, shall be deemed and taken (only as against that person, his heirs,
executors, administrators and assigns, whose actions, debts, accounts, damages, penal-
ties and forfeitures, by such covinous or fraudulent devices and practices aforesaid, are,
shall, or might be in anywise disturbed, hindered, delayed or defrauded) to be utterly
void and of no effect; any pretense, color, feigned consideration, expressing of use, or
any other matter or thing to the contrary notwithstanding; and in all actions by creditors
to set gifts, grants, alienations, and conveyances of lands and tenements and judgments
purporting to be liens on the same on the ground that such gifts, grants, alienations,
conveyances and judgments are feigned, covinous and fraudulent hereunder, it shall be
no defense to the action to allege and prove that the lands and tenements alleged to be
so conveyed or encumbered do not exceed in value the homestead allowed by law as an
exemption; Provided, that nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the sale
under execution or other final process, obtained on any debt during the continuance of
the homestead, of any interest in such land as may be exempt by homestead.
'Bank of New Hanover v. Adrian, 116 N.C. 537, 547, 21 S.E. 792, 795 (1895).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-19 (1966); see note 135 and accompanying text infra.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-16 (1966) provides:
Every conveyance, charge, lease or encumbrance of any lands or hereditaments, goods
and chattels, if the same be made with the actual intent to defraud such person who has
purchased or shall purchase in fee simple or for lives or years the same lands or hercdit-
ments, goods and chattels, or to defraud such as shall purchase any rent or profit out of
the same, shall be deemed utterly void against such person and others claiming under
him who shall purchase for the full value thereof the same lands or hereditaments, goods
and chattels, or rents or profits out of the same, without notice before and at the time
of his purchase of the conveyance, charge, lease or encumbrance, by him alleged to have
been made with intent to defraud; and possession taken or held by or for the person
claiming under such alleged fraudulent conveyance, charge, lease or encumbrance shall
be always deemed and taken as notice in law of the same.
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with several important modifications. In 1840 the North Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly amended the statute to provide a remedy only to those
subsequent purchasers who bought without notice of the grantor's fraud
and who paid "full value." 9 The statute was further amended to afford
a remedy to subsequent purchasers of personalty as well as land.' The
latter amendment brought section 39-16 in line with decisions that
achieved the same result on common law principles notwithstanding the
limitations of 27 Elizabeth." Sections 39-15, 39-16, and 39-19 constitute
the principal sources of the law of fraudulent conveyances as it has
developed in North Carolina.
In 1918 the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act was approved by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Since that time it has been adopted in twenty-seven states, not including
North Carolina. The Commissioners in their Prefatory Note to the Act
stated what they considered to be the reasons for the confusion that
surrounded the law of fraudulent in jurisdictions relying on either
Elizabethan-type statutes or judicial decisions recognizing the Elizabe-
than statutes as part of the common law:
The confusion and uncertainties of the existing law which have been
referred to are due primarily to three things:
First, the absence of any well recognized, definite conception
of insolvency.
Second, failure to make clear the persons legally injured by a
given fraudulent conveyance.
Third, the attempt to make the Statute of Elizabeth cover all
conveyances which wrong creditors, even though the actual
intent to defraud does not exist.'
The Uniform Act has been characterized as substantially a restatement
of 13 Elizabeth, with the exception that under the Uniform Act certain
conveyances are declared to be fraudulent irrespective of the grantor's
actual intent. 3 Indeed, under section eleven 4 of the Uniform Act, re-
sort must be had to common law principles where specific provisions of
'Ch. 28, §§ 1-2, 1840 N.C. Sess. L. 59-60. See also Hiatt v. Wade, 30 N.C. 340, 343 (1848).
"The second amendment to 27 Elizabeth was first codified in N.C. CODE § 34-1546 (1883).
A careful search, however, has failed to locate the amending session law.
"See, e.g., Plummer v. Worley, 35 N.C. 423, 424 (1852).
"UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, Prefatory Note.
"See 37 Azu. JUR. 2d Fraudulent Conveyances § 3 (1968), citing Neal v. Clark, 75 Ariz. 91,
251 P.2d 903 (1952).
"UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES ACT § I I [hereinafter cited as UFCA].
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the Act are not dispositive.' 5 A question thus arises as to why the Uni-
form Act, which purports only to eliminate confusion through restate-
ment and not to abrogate existing common law principles, has not been
more widely adopted. The primary object of this comment is to analyze
the law of fraudulent conveyances as it has developed in North Carolina;
the secondary purpose is to determine if there are indeed areas of confu-
sion that could be elucidated by adoption of the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act. 6
The law of fraudulent conveyances in North Carolina has been
reduced to the five principles articulated in the landmark case of Aman
v. Walker.7 With few exceptions, in all subsequent cases the North
Carolina courts have resolved any questions concerning fraudulent con-
veyances with reference to one or more of the Aman v. Walker princi-
ples. Accordingly, these principles provide a convenient framework for
analyzing North Carolina law in this area and comparing with it the
provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. 8
THRESHOLD CONSIDERATIONS
Before proceeding with consideration of the Aman v. Walker prin-
ciples, it is helpful to examine certain fundamental concepts that have
general applicability to the entire law of fraudulent conveyances.
The Concept of Conveyance
The term "conveyance" has been regarded by the North Carolina
courts and those of other Elizabethan jurisdictions as being broad
enough to cover any transaction involving fraud. 9 Accordingly, the
North Carolina Supreme Court has brought a great variety of transfers
'5Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U.S. 348 (1932).
"Fraudulent conveyances in a bankruptcy context are beyond the scope of this comment. It
should be noted, however, that the fact of a debtor's fraudulent conveyance of property may have
important ramifications under the law of bankruptcy. First, under Bankruptcy Act § 3(a)(l), I I
U.S.C. § 21(a)(l) (1964), a fraudulent transfer by a debtor is an act of bankruptcy. Secondly,
under Bankruptcy Act § 14(c)(4), 11 U.S.C. § 21(c)(4) (1964), a bankrupt who has made a fraud-
ulent transfer may be prevented from obtaining a discharge. Finally, the trustee in bankruptcy can
invalidate fraudulent transfers under Bankruptcy Act § 67(d), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1964), or
under Bankruptcy Act § 70(e), II U.S.C. § 110(e) (1964).
17165 N.C. 224, 81 S.E. 162 (1914).
"Certain provisions of the Uniform Act have been construed differently by the courts. This
comment, however, does not purport to deal extensively with such case law under the Uniform
Act.
1937 AM. JUR. 2d Fraudulent Conveyances § 58 (1968).
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within the scope of the fraudulent conveyance statutes."' Similarly, sec-
tion one of the Uniform Act defines "conveyance" to include" every
payment of money, assignment, release, transfer, lease, mortgage or
pledge of tangible or intangible property, and also the creation of any
lien or incumbrance."' Thus, under either the Elizabethan-type statute
or the Uniform Act, the form of a transfer or conveyance will never be
determinative of its validity.
Type Property Affected
Generally, any property of a debtor that can be reached by his
creditors is within the purview of both the Elizabethan statute and the
Uniform Act. Property that is exempt could not be reached by creditors
under any circumstances and hence could not be the subject matter of
a fraudulent conveyance. 22 Accordingly, it has been held in North Caro-
lina that a debtor who fraudulently conveys property to his wife but
continues to occupy the premises is still entitled to claim his homestead
exemption and resist the efforts of his creditors to invalidate the convey-
ance.?3 It has also been held in North Carolina that a debtor's convey-
ance to his wife of property owned by the entirety is not subject to
invalidation .2  Similarly, under section one of the Uniform Act any
property of the debtor that is "not exempt from liability for his debts"
is considered to be part of the debtor's assets and any conveyance of
such assets is subject to invalidation under the Act's other provisions?
2See, e.g., Moore v. Greenville Banking & Trust, 173 N.C. 180, 91 S.E. 793 (1917) (transfer
of money by debtor to wife's bank account); Michael v. Moore, 157 N.C. 462, 73 S.E. 104 (1911)
(investment in capital improvements upon wife's property); Burton v. Farinholdt, 86 N.C. 260
(1882) (assignment of life insurance policy); Powell v. Howell, 63 N.C. 283 (1869) (feigned confess-
sion of judgment).
21UFCA § i.
22See Wright v. Bond, 127 N.C. 39, 37 S.E. 65 (1900).
"Rose v. Bryan, 157 N.C. 173, 72 S.E. 960 (1911).
21L & M Gas Co. v. Leggett, 273 N.C. 547, 161 S.E.2d 23 (1968). The court reached its result
on the grounds that a creditor's lien could never attach to property held by the entirety and that
the creditor in the action was seeking to reach not the rents or profits accruing from the property
but the property itself. Id. at 550, 161 S.E.2d at 27. See also Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. Lester,
190 N.C. 411, 130 S.E. 45 (1925), which holds that a transfer of land held in resulting trust cannot
be invalidated by creditors of the trustee.
2'UFCA § I reads in part: "In this act 'Assets' of a debtor means property not exempt from
liability for his debts. To the extent that any property is liable for any debts of the debtor, such
property shall be included in his assets." It is interesting to note that the Uniform Act defines
"conveyance" in terms of "property" and not in terms of "assets." See text accompanying note
21 supra. One commentator has suggested that a literal reading of these Uniform Act definitions
affords an argument that exempt property can be the subject of a fraudulent conveyance. D.
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Fair or Valuable Consideration
General Concepts. Highly important in the law of fraudulent con-
veyances is the concept of fair or valuable consideration. Under the
Elizabethan statutes, a determination that a conveyance was not made
for valuable consideration means that the conveyance was "voluntary"
and more subject to invalidation than if valuable consideration had
passed. A conveyance is deemed not for value, or voluntary, when the
purchaser does not pay a "reasonably fair price;"" moreover, this fail-
ure is regarded as indicative of unfair dealing and suggestive of fraud."
Notably, the first three principles stated in Aman v. Walker apply only
to voluntary conveyances, and the law of fraudulent conveyances leans
much harder on voluntary conveyances than on those where valuable
consideration passed.
28
In North Carolina the question of valuable consideration is impor-
tant in two other contexts. Before a purchaser can under section 39-19
protect a title obtained from a grantor proven to have had actual fraudu-
lent intent, he must show that he gave "good consideration."" "Good
consideration" does not mean that the purchaser paid every dollar the
property conveyed was worth, but only a "reasonably fair price." 0
Thus, what is "good consideration" amounts to "valuable considera-
tion," and case law applicable in determining whether a conveyance was
voluntary is also applicable to the issue of whether good consideration
passed in a bona fide purchaser context. Before a purchser can avoid a
conveyance under section 39-16, he must show that "full value" was
paid for the property conveyed .3 North Carolina courts treat the term
"full value" as being synonomous with the terms" valuable considera-
tion" and "good consideration." Easily seen at this point is the import-
ance of the concept of valuable consideration to the law of fraudulent
conveyances in North Carolina; less easily seen is why a concept so
important has not been more adequately defined.
Under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, it is also highly
Epstein, Materials on Debtor-Creditor Relations, IV-41a, 1971 (unpublished manuscript in Uni-
versity of North Carolina Law School Library). Courts applying the Uniform Act, however, have
not taken this view. Id.
28L & M Gas Co. v. Leggett, 273 N.C. 547, 549, 161 S.E.2d 23, 25 (1968).
vld.
"'See text accompanying notes 134-37 infra.
29See note 135 infra.
Austin v. Staten, 126 N.C. 783, 788-89, 36 S.E. 338, 340 (1900).
31See note 8 supra.
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important whether a transfer was for "fair consideration." In order for
conveyances to be invalidated under section four,32 section five,3 3 or
section six34 of the Uniform Act, it must first be established that no
"fair consideration" was paid. Moreover, the limitation on the remedies
of creditors that is presented in section nine of the Act as against bona
fide purchasers arises only upon proof that the latter paid "fair consider-
ation.13' The Uniform Act in section three does make an attempt to
define "fair consideration" in a manner more helpful than the defini-
tional treatment rendered "valuable consideration" by the North Caro-
lina courts. Section three states:
Fair consideration is given for property, or obligation, (a) When in
exchange for such property, or obligation, as a fair equivalent there-
for, and in good faith, property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is
satisfied, or (b) When such property, or obligation is received in good
faith to secure a present advance or antecedent debt in amount not
disproportionately small as compared with the value of the property,
or obligation obtained."
It is readily apparent that the Uniform Act's definition of "fair consid-
eration" is at best a slight improvement over the Elizabethan-judicial
definition of "valuable consideration" because of the uncertain meaning
of such key phrases as "fair equivalent therefor" in section 3(a) and
"amount not disproportionately small" in section 3(b). In practice the
courts applying the Uniform Act definition to various types of consider-
ation appear to arrive at the same conclusions as do courts in North
Carolina applying their own definitions.
Jury Question. Ordinarily the North Carolina courts leave undis-
turbed the finding of the jury on the issue of whether valuable considera-
tion passed. The wide latitude accorded juries on this issue was ex-
pressed in an early North Carolina case:
Prices may range between the extremes of what close men would call
a good bargain on one hand and a bad or even a hard bargain on the
other, and the law may not interfere. But when such a price is given,
or pretended to be given, that everybody who knows the estate will
exclaim at once, "why he has got the land for nothing," the law would
31UFCA § 4. For further discussion see note 78 and accompanying text infra.
"UFCA § 5. For further discussion see note 91 and accompanying text infra.
"1UFCA § 6. For further discussion see note 192 and accompanying text infra.
"See note 148 and accompanying text infra.
34UFCA § 3 (emphasis added).
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be false to itself if it did not say sternly and without qualification, to
such person, that he had not entitled himself to the grace and protec-
tion of the statute.3
7
The court continued in this same case to say that it takes more than a
"peppercorn" to constitute valuable consideration.3 1 It can be seen that
the inquiry here is not into the "adequacy" of the consideration. In
North Carolina, a jury determination that valuable consideration was
paid is overturned only when the court finds that the value of the consid-
eration was grossly inadequate compared to the value of the goods
sold.39 This appears to be the practice, too, in jurisdictions following
the Uniform Act.4" Thus, under either North Carolina law or the Uni-
form Act, consideration that has a value reasonably disproportionate to
the value of the land or goods purchased can still be found "valuable"
or "fair."
Past Indebtedness as Qualifying. One issue frequently raised in this
area is whether a conveyance to secure past indebtedness or to secure a
present loan is for valuable consideration. In North Carolina the general
rule is that past or present indebtedness can serve as valuable considera-
tion so long as the debt is not grossly inadequate when compared with
the value of the interest conveyed." Some authority, however, has it that
in a bona fide purchaser context the degree of protection varies as
between one who purchases by satisfying or securing past indebtedness
and one who advances new consideration or incurs new liability. In
Wallace v. Cohen42 the North Carolina court acknowledged the general
rule that past or presently incurred debt could serve as valuable consid-
eration, but with the qualification that any purchaser such as an assignee
for the benefit of a defrauding vendee's creditors would take subject to
any equities that arose while the property was in the hands of the
'Fullenwider v. Roberts, 20 N.C. 420, 429-30 (1839).
1Id. at 431.
"The notion of grossly inadequate consideration has been applied in North Carolina purely
on a case-by-case approach. See, e.g., Wachovia Loan & Trust Co. v. Forbes, 120 N.C. 355, 27
S.E. 43 (1897) (a difference of $1,500 between the purchase price of $7,000 and actual value or
$8,500 was not grossly inadequate); Reiger v. Davis, 67 N.C. 185 (1872) (court refused to hold that
the consideration of $2,000 and rents reserved for land worth $3,000 was not grossly inadequate),
Harris v. DeFraffenreid, 33 N.C. 89 (1850) (one who gives one-half or two-thirds of the actual
value of goods as consideration has not given full value).
"See 37 AM. JUR. 2d Fraudulent Conveyances § 19 (1968) and authorities cited therein.
"See Fowle v. McLean, 168 N.C. 537, 541, 84 S.E. 852, 854 (1915); Brem v. Lockhardt, 93
N.C. 191, 193-95 (1885).
42111 N.C. 103, 15 S.E. 892 (1892).
[Vol. 50
FRA UDULENT CONVEYANCES
debtor. 3 Thus, although past indebtedness may be valuable considera-
tion so as to qualify one for the protection of section 39-19, that protec-
tion has been limited by judicial doctrine. Section three of the Uniform
Act makes a distinction not upon whether new credit was extended or
new liability incurred but according to whether property was conveyed
as security (section 3a) or in satisfaction for an antecedent debt (section
3b). 11 The effect of this distinction seems to be that the value of property
conveyed to satisfy an antecedent debt must be fairly equivalent to the
amount of the debt, but the value of property conveyed to secure either
an antecedent debt or a present advance need only not be "dispropor-
tionately small as compared with the value of the property, or obligation
obtained," to qualify as fair consideration.
Executory Promises as Qualifying. Under both North Carolina
law' " and the Uniform Act as applied in a few jurisdictions,46 executory
promises of support can serve as consideration. However, this general
statement is subject to considerable qualification. Where personal serv-
ices are asserted to have been the consideration in a transaction between
relatives, there arises under the Elizabethan statutes in North Carolina
a rebuttable presumption that the services were gratuitous. 7 Moreover,
the relationship of the parties in such a conveyance, if coupled with
other circumstances suggestive of fraud, may raise a strong presumption
of fraud4" that in the absence of rebuttal would compel a finding renders
moot the question of whether a conveyance was voluntary."0 Under the
Uniform Act it is likely that the relationship of the parties in such a
situation and the nature of the consideration would be indicative of a
lack of "good faith." This would aid an attacking creditor in his efforts
to bring the conveyance under one of the Act's invalidating provisions
13Accord, Carpenter v. Duke, 144 N.C. 291, 56 S.E. 938 (1907).
uSee text accompanying note 36 supra.
"Worthy v. Brady, 91 N.C. 265 (1884); Cansler v. Cobb, 77 N.C. 30 (1877).
I'Manello v. Bornstine, 44 Wash. 2d 769, 270 P.2d 1059 (1954); Massey-Harris Co. v. Rich,
233 Mo. App. 509, 122 S.W.2d 858 (1909).
"Farmer's Bank v. McCullers, 201 N.C. 412, 160 S.E.2d 494 (1931).
"See Peeler v. Peeler, 109 N.C. 628, 14 S.E. 59 (1891).
"See note 116 and accompanying text infra.
"Where there has been a transfer to a party who has partly performed an executory promise
of support serving as consideration, the North Carolina courts will uphold the transfer to the extent
of support actually provided. People's Bank & Trust Co. v. Mackorell, 195 N.C. 741, 143 S.E.
518 (1928). This situation, however, arises only where the grantee in a fraudulent conveyance has
not been guilty of actual fraud but has been charged with knowledge of facts making him guilty
of constructive fraud.
1972]
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that requires an absence of fair consideration.5 It would also defeat any
claim by the grantee of bona fide purchaser status in an effort to limit
the remedies available to opposing creditors under section nine.5"
PRINCIPLE ONE
"If the conveyance is voluntary, and the grantor retains property
fully sufficient and available to pay his debts then existing, and there is
no actual intent to defraud, the conveyance is valid."
53
The first principle of Aman v. Walker indicates that the mere fact
of a conveyance having been made for less than valuable consideration
does not by itself make the conveyance fraudulent. Where there is not
any actual intent to defraud54 on the part of the grantor such as to enable
creditors or purchasers under section 39-15 or section 39-16 to invali-
date a conveyance, and where the grantor was not insolvent at the time
of conveyance so as to raise any presumption of fraud,55 a conveyance
is valid even if voluntary.
PRINCIPLE Two
"If the conveyance is voluntary, and the grantor did not retain
property fully sufficient and available to pay his debts then existing, it
is invalid as to creditors; but it cannot be impeached by subsequent
creditors without proof of the existence of a debt at the time of its
execution, which is unpaid, and when this is established and the convey-
ance avoided, subsequent creditors are let in and the property is sub-
jected to the payment of creditors generally.""
A literal reading of 13 and 27 Elizabeth seems to suggest that only
conveyances made with actual intent to defraud are voidable.5" Fre-
quently, however, a debtor will make a transfer for less than valuable
consideration-in other words, a voluntary transfer-that has the effect
of injuring his creditors and yet may not have been made with actual
"See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
5"See notes 148-49 infra.
'1165 N.C. at 227, 81 S.E.at 164 (emphasis added).
51The concept of actual fraudulent intent is more fully developed at notes 93-133 and accompa-
nying text infra.
"The presumption of fraud that arises upon proof of a grantor's insolvency at the time he
makes a voluntary conveyance is treated at notes 57-79 and accompanying text infra.
1165 N.C. at 227, 81 S.E. at 164 (emphasis added).
"See text accompanying note 148 infra. The concept of actual fraud is more fully developed
in the text accompanying notes 93-133 infra.
[Vol. 50
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fraudulent intent. Courts in North Carolina early developed presump-
tions of fraud to deal with this type of situation. One such presumption
arose from the mere fact of a debtor making a voluntary conveyance;
5
it arose without regard to whether the debtor had retained enough prop-
erty after the conveyance to satisfy the claims of his creditors. In 1840
the North Carolina legislature altered this judicial practice with the
passage of section 39-17, which reads as follows:
No voluntary gift or settlement of property by one indebted shall
be deemed or taken to be void in law, as to creditors of the donor or
settler prior to such gift or settlement, by reason merely of such indebt-
edness, if property, at the time of making such gift or settlement, fully
sufficient and available for the satisfaction of his then creditors, be
retained by such donor or settler; but the indebtedness of the donor or
settler at such time shall be held and taken, as well with respect to
creditors prior as creditors subsequent to such gift or settlement, to be
evidence only from which an intent to delay, hinder or defraud credi-
tors may be inferred; and in any trial shall, as such, be submitted by
the court to the jury, with such observations as may be right and
proper.59
In short, the statute destroyed any presumption of vitiating fraud in
the making of a voluntary gift or settlement solely from the indebted-
ness of the donor or settlor, and made the failure to retain property fully
sufficient and available for the satisfaction of his [the debtor's]
creditors a requisite of such presumption.' Expressed otherwise, a pre-
sumption of fraud will arise only upon proof that the transfer was
voluntary and that after the transfer the debtor was insolvent.
What, then, is "property. . . fully sufficient, and available for the
satisfaction of his then creditors"? In dealing with this problem of defin-
ing insolvency, the North Carolina courts have consistently refused to
establish any fixed proportion of retained assets to liabilities that will
be determinative.6 One reason that case law is so indecisive regarding
"It should be noted that this presumption differs from the presumption that is sometimes said
to rise where a combination of certain suspicious circumstances or badges of fraud are present.
The matter of presumed fraud here also differs from the situation in which "the fraudulent charac-
ter of the deed depends on a variety of facts and circumstances connected with the transaction going
to show the motive and intent 'where it is entirely for the jury to decide.'" McCanless v. Flinchum,
89 N.C. 373, 374-75 (1883).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-17 (1966).
eOHood v. Cobb, 207 N.C. 128, 130, 176 S.E. 288, 289 (1934).
"See, e.g., Black v. Sanders, 46 N.C. 67 (1853).
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a definition of insolvency is that the issue is a matter for the jury."2 With
few reported exceptions, 3 the jury's factual determination of solvency
or insolvency, after hearing testimony as to the nature and extent of a
transferor's assets and liabilities remains undisturbed. The North Caro-
lina courts have limited themselves to general suggestions, such as say-
ing that it is necessary to ask whether a lender would extend credit for
the amount of existing debt with such security as the assets transferor
retained.64 Guidelines for the jury are, however, available in the case
law. Clearly the nature of the retained assets-for example, whether
they are perishable 5-must be considered. Also, the jury must discount
any exempt property in its calculation of the value of retained assets."0
Where the debtor has a debt in the form of a surety obligation, such
factors as the principal's solvency are looked to in an effort to ascertain
the debtor's ultimate liability.7 It should be noted, too, that the debtor's
solvency is determined as of the time of the conveyance. Insolvency that
subsequently occurs because of an act of God, business misfortune, or
other fortuitous happening does not invalidate an earlier conveyance,
although such facts may be offered as evidence on the issue of actual
fraudulent intention.
Determining whether a debtor was solvent at the time he made a
conveyance is obviously a difficult task under the North Carolina-
Elizabethan case-by-case approach. The Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act offers the following definition of insolvency in an effort to
facilitate such a determination: "A person is insolvent when the present
fair salable value of his assets is less than the amount that will be
required to pay his probable liability on his existing debts as they be-
come absolute and matured."69 The Uniform Act definition also focuses
on the transferor's financial condition at the time of transfer. In addi-
tion, according to the Act's definition of "assets," 7 exempt property is
"Garland v. Arrowood, 177 N.C. 371, 373, 99 S.E. 100, 102 (1919).
"See Williams v. Hughes, 136 N.C. 58, 48 S.E. 518 (1904), for a rare case in which the court
ruled as a matter of law that the property retained was insufficient to meet the claims of creditors.
See also the dissent in Shuford v. Cook, 169 N.C. 52, 85 S.E. 142 (1915), in which the court had
refused to find insolvency as a matter of law.
"Black v. Sanders, 46 N.C. 67, 69 (1853).
"Williams v. Hughes, 136 N.C. 58, 48 S.E. 518 (1904).
"Id. See also Hood v. Cobb, 207 N.C. 128, 176 S.E. 288 (1934).
"Shuford v. Cook, 169 N.C. 52, 85 S.E. 142 (1915).
"Unaka & City Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 201 N.C. 148, 156, 159 S.E. 312, 317 (1931).
62UFCA § 2(1). UFCA § 2(2) deals with the question of partnership insolvency.
"See note 25 supra.
[Vol. 50
FRA UD ULENT CONVEYANCES
not considered. Another similarity between the Uniform Act approach
to defining insolvency and that of the North Carolina courts lies in the
treatment of liabilities. The Uniform Act looks to a debtor's "probable
liability," just as the North Carolina courts look to a debtor's "ultimate
liability,"' 7' and both approaches provide a realistic treatment of contin-
gent liabilities. The primary difference seems to be in the Uniform Act's
singular insistence on looking to the "salable value" .of assets rather
than leaving the matter in the hands of a jury with only general instruc-
tions. The appraisal of "salable value" is of course in itself a difficult
problem for the jury, but the overall approach of the Uniform Act
appears preferable to that followed in North Carolina.
The question of burden of proof on the issue of solvency has long
troubled the North Carolina courts.. Notwithstanding the 1840 statute,
an early line of decisions held that there arose a presumption of fraud
upon the mere showing that a conveyance was voluntary and that the
burden of proof on the issue of "sufficiency of property retained" or
solvency rested upon the party seeking to uphold the conveyance. 2 A
recent case, however, clearly overrules these decisions and places the
ultimate burden of providing insolvency upon the party attacking the
conveyance. 73 Apparently, however, courts still impose a burden of
producing at least some evidence tending to show solvency upon the
party seeking to uphold a conveyance found by a jury to have been
voluntary.7 1
The effect of a party's establishing that sufficient property was not
retained by the grantor-in other words, that a grantor was insol-
vent-is to raise a presumption that a voluntary conveyance was fraudu-
lent. Expressed differently, the presumption that "formerly arose
merely from the fact of a voluntary conveyance made by a debtor"7 5
arises now upon a showing of giantor insolvency at the time of convey-
ance. This presumption is apparently conclusive, and the conveyance is
"See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
"See, e.g., Hobbs v. Cashwell, 152 N.C. 183, 67 S.E. 495 (1910); McCanless v. Flinchum, 89
N.C. 373 (1883).
13Virginia-Carolina Laundry Supply Corp. v. Scott, 267 N.C. 145, 148 S.E.2d I (1966). See
also Hood v. Cobb, 207 N.C. 128, 176 S.E.2d 288 (1934); Wallace v. Phillips, 195 N.C. 665, 143
S.E. 244 (1928); Taylor v. Eatman, 92 N.C. 602 (1885).
" Virginia-Carolina Laundry Supply Corp. v. Scott, 267 N.C. 145, 154, 148 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1966);
Garland v. Arrowood, 177 N.C. 371, 99 S.E. 100 (1919).
"Hood v. Cobb, 207 N.C. 128, 130, 176 S.E. 288, 289 (1934).
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void in law without regard to actual fraudulent intent.7 There is no
opportunity for the party defending the conveyance to rebut such pre-
sumption, unlike the situation in which a presumption of actual fraudu-
lent intent has arisen because of the presence of certain badges of fraud
of suspicious circumstances surrounding the transactionY.7 Thus, under
North Carolina law, if a proper party establishes that a conveyance was
voluntary and that the grantor was insolvent at the time of the convey-
ance, the conveyance is void without regard to the grantor's actual
intent.
The Uniform Act adopts essentially the same rule in section four,
which provides that "[e]very conveyance made and every obligation
incurred by a person who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent is
fraudulent as to creditors without regard to his actual intent if the
conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair consider-
ation.1 78 Under section four there are no problems with presumptions
or burdens of proof. If a creditor can establish that a debtor is or will
be rendered insolvent by a conveyance and that the conveyance was
made without fair consideration,79 the conveyance is declared fraudulent
as to him. The burden of proof according to the language of the provi-
sion clearly rests upon the party attacking the conveyance. North Caro-
lina, therefore, by virtue of section 39-17 and unlike many other Eliza-
bethan jurisdictions, is closely in line with the Uniform Act in its treat-
ment of voluntary conveyances made by an insolvent debtor. The main
difference lies in the fact that North Carolina relies on contrived pre-
sumptions of fraud that strain the language of sections 39-15 and 39-16
to arrive at the same result that can be easily reached under a clear
statutory provision in the Uniform Act.
The effect of a party's establishing that "sufficient property" was
retained by a grantor is to prevent any presumption of fraud from
arising. The existence of an unpaid debt is, however, evidence of actual
7 Michael v. Moore, 157 N.C. 462,466,73 S.E. 104, 105 (1911). See also Burton v. Farinholdt,
86 N.C. 261, 262-63 (1882), in which the court stated:
Being indebted to a state of clear insolvency at the time of voluntary assignment. . .
the debtor's act was fraudulent as to his creditors and void in law, whether made with
an intent actually fraudulent or not. . .From the fact that he was at the time insolvent
and that his transfer to his daughters was without valuable consideration, it results as a
conclusion of law that the assignment was void as to his creditors.
nSee text accompanying notes 107-119 infra.
7RUFCA § 4.
"See text accompanying note 36 supra.
"OVirginia-Carolina Laundry Supply Corp. v. Scott, 267 N.C. 145, 154, 148 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1966);
Shuford v. Cook, 169 N.C. 52, 55, 85 S.E. 142, 144 (1915).
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fraudulent intent and is by itself enough to take a creditor to the jury
on that issue under section 39-17.81
At this point it is necessary to determine who can attack a fraudu-
lent conveyance. Generally, creditors and others actually defrauded
have standing to set aside a conveyance under section 39-15.82 Under
section 39-1 6. 3 subsequent purchasers who pay full value and have no
notice of a grantor's fraud can void a conveyance that was made with
the intent to defraud them. Once a creditor or purchaser has shown
actual fraud on the part of the grantor, the transfer is void as to the
former, whether his claim was in existence at the time of the conveyance
or arose subsequently. To these general statements, however, there are
several qualifications. First, the attacking party must have been injured
by the conveyance. 84 In other words, a conveyance that does not harm
a creditor's interests can hardly be said to have been with intent to
"delay, hinder and defraud" him. Secondly, if the ground for attacking
the conveyance is not actual fraudulent intent on the part of the grantor
but fraud presumed from the fact of the grantor's having made a volun-
tary conveyance while insolvent, it makes a difference whether the at-
tacking party stands as an existing or a subsequent creditor.
It is clear under the second principle of Aman v. Walker that a
subsequent creditor cannot impeach a conveyance that was voluntary
and made while the debtor was insolvent unless he can show the exist-
ence of a prior creditor who remains unpaid. Moreover, before any
subsequent creditor can reach the property transferred, it appears neces-
sary not only that an existing unpaid creditor be found but also that the
latter have brought suit and had the conveyance declared void., The
effect of this is to preclude a subsequent creditor from relying on pre-
sumptive or constructive fraud to avoid a conveyance.8" This does not
necessarily mean, however, that the subsequent creditor is without a
remedy. He can still prove actual fraudulent intent on the part of the
"Helms v. Green, 105 N.C. 251, 262, 11 S.E. 470, 474 (1890).
'
2See note 7 supra. Cases arising under the Elizabethan statute recognize that the term
"creditor" is broad enough to embrace any persons whose interests are prejudicially affected by
a transfer of assets by one against whom a right of action exists. 37 AM. JUR. 2d Fraudulent
Conveyances § 134 (1968).
x3See note 8 supra.
"People's Oil Co. v. Richardson, 271 N.C. 696, 700, 157 S.E.2d 369, 373 (1967); Helms v.
Green, 105 N.C. 251, If S.E. 470 (1890).
"'Powell.Bros. v. McMullan Lumber Co., 153 N.C. 52, 58, 68 S.E. 926, 929 (1910); Clement
v. Cozart, 112 N.C. 412, 422, 17 S.E. 486, 489 (1893).
"See Harris v. Carolina Distrib. Co., 172 N.C. 14, 16, 89 S.E.2d 789, 790 (1916).
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grantor and void the conveyance; or, if an existing creditor voids the
conveyance on grounds of presumptive or actual fraud, the subsequent
creditor can subject the remains of the property conveyed to his claims
on the principle that "a conveyance in fraud of one creditor is void as
to all creditors.
' 8 7
The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act broadly defines a credi-
tor as "a person having any claim, whether matured or unmatured,
liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent." 88 In the Act's
five invalidating provisions, however, some distinctions can be drawn
between the rights of existing and subsequent creditors. Section seven "
of the Uniform Act adopts the Elizabethan statutory rule and declares
that where a conveyance is made with actual intent to defraud as to
"either present or future creditors," it is "fraudulent as to both present
and future creditors." Section four 0 declares only that certain convey-
ances are void as to "creditors." Since section four, unlike section seven,
does not specifically invalidate conveyances as to both present and fu-
ture creditors, presumably only existing or present creditors are pro-
tected. This, too, is in line with the North Carolina rule. The Uniform
Act, however, has two other invalidating provisions that are made avail-
able specifically to subsequent creditors. Section five provides:
Every conveyance made without fair consideration when the person
making it is engaged or. about to engage in a business or transaction
for which the property remaining in his hands after the conveyance is
an unreasonably small capital, is fraudulent as to creditors and as to
other persons who become creditors during the continuance of such
business or transaction without regard to his actual intent.'
In North Carolina, a subsequent creditor in the above situation could
use the fact of a conveyance leaving the business with "unreasonably
small capital" as evidence of fraud, but he would nevertheless have to
prove actual fraudulent intent in order to void the conveyance. Section
six of the Uniform Act provides:
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred without fair
'?Hoke v. Henderson, 14 N.C. 12 (1831).
-UFCA § 1.
"UFCA § 7 provides: "Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual
intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or
future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors."
1"UFCA § 4; see note 69 and accompanying text supra.
"UFCA § 5 (emphasis added).
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consideration when the person making the conveyance or entering into
the obligation intends or believes that he will incur debts beyond his
ability to pay as they mature, is fraudulent as to both present and
future creditors.
92
Section six may appear to afford a subsequent creditor more protection
than he would enjoy in an Elizabethan jurisdiction such as North Caro-
lina. But under Elizabethan case law and that of North Carolina, proof
of such subjective intent as is required by section six would undoubtedly
necessitate a jury finding of actual fraud.
PRINCIPLE THREE
"If the conveyance is voluntary and made with the actual intent
upon the part of the grantor to defraud creditors, it is void, although
this fraudulent intent is not participated in by the grantee, and although




Under both the Statute of Elizabeth as adopted in North Carolina
and section seven" of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, a vol-
untary conveyance made with actual fraudulent intent is fraudulent and
voidable. This third principle of Aman v. Walker can be so stated
without fear of ignoring the rights of bona fide purchasers, since by
definition a voluntary conveyance is one made without valuable consid-
eration, and proof of valuable consideration is a requisite for asserting
bona fide purchaser status under either section 39-191- or the Uniform
Act. 6 The concept of actual fraudulent intent, as opposed to fraud
presumed upon proof of insolvency and lack of valuable consideration,
lies at the heart of the law of fraudulent conveyances. Intent has been
described as the "essential and poisonous element" that makes a trans-
action fraudulent.97 Intent is said to involve an inquiry looking to the
grantor's purpose in making a transfer, going beyond the mere effect it
may have on his creditors."
In spite of the ostensibly subjective nature of the inquiry into a
debtor's intent or purpose in making a conveyance, at times the North
"UFCA § 6 (emphasis added).
"1165 N.C. at 227, 81 S.E. at 164 (emphasis added).
9"See note 89 supra.
"See text accompanying note 135 infra.
"See text accompanying note 148 infra.
OlMoore v. Hinnant, 89 N.C. 455, 459 (1883).
OxId.
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Carolina courts have tended to treat this element objectively. The North
Carolina Supreme Court put it thusly:
Acts fraudulent in view of the law because of their necessary tendency
to delay or obstruct the creditor in pursuit of his legal remedy, do not
cease to be such because the fraud as an independent fact was not then
in mind. If a person does and intends to do that which from its conse-
quences the law pronounces fraudulent, he is held to intend the fraud
inseparable from the act.9
In other words, the effects that a conveyance has upon the interests of
a transferor's creditors may cause his intent to be regarded as fraudu-
lent.' Moreover, the object of a debtor need not have been the complete
defeat of a creditor on his claims; it is sufficient "if the object was to
blind him [the creditor], to put him to a difficulty as to his remedy, so
as to delay him of a direct one, and hinder him . .. ."10
Proof of fraudulent intent in North Carolina is a complicated mat-
ter involving several different presumptions that the courts have devel-
oped. Fraudulent intent can be proved in North Carolina on three differ-
ent levels, with the procedural path varying according to the relative
likelihood of fraud in view of the facts of a particular case. On the first
level, a court may pronounce a conveyance to be void at law or may
conclusively presume its fraudulence. This most often occurs where
fraud clearly appears on the face of a deed or other instrument. °0 Fraud-
ulent intent may also be conclusively presumed from the declarations
of the grantor, either in the deed itself or by some other form of binding
admission. 03 But ordinarily courts are very reluctant to find fraud as
a matter of law, since intent is an operation of the mind and should be
proven and found as a fact by the jury. 104 The conclusive presumption
of fraud arises only where the suspicious circumstances that appear
cannot be explained by other facts and circumstances. 05
"Cheatham v. Hawkins, 80 N.C. 161, 163-64 (1879).
"'Stone v. Marshall, 52 N.C. 300, 302 (1859).
"'Purcell v. McCallum, 18 N.C. 221, 226 (1835).
"1See Brown v. Mitchell, 102 N.C. 347, 348, 9 S.E. 702, 703 (1889). One example is where
the parties set out in the deed itself that a secret trust was created. Sturdivant v. Davis, 31 N.C.
365 (1849).
'Royster v. Stallings, 124 N.C. 55, 64, 32 S.E. 384, 386 (1889).
"'See Sills v. Morgan, 217 N.C. 662, 666, 9 S.E.2d 518, 520 (1940), and cases cited therein.
"'Howell v. Elliot, 12 N.C. 76, 78 (1826). Thus, it has been held that the retention or property
by a vendor after sale is not conclusively fraudulent since it can be explained. Vick v. Kegs, 3 N.C.
126 (1800). But a conveyance absolute on its face that is shown to have been intended as security




Where fraud does not appear on the face of a deed or in the declara-
tions of the parties, the creditor or purchaser attacking the conveyance
must resort to the second- and third-level approaches by presenting facts
and circumstances surrounding the transaction that tend to prove fraud-
ulent intent. The nature of this inquiry has been described as follows:
Since intent is an operation of the mind it should be proven and
found as a fact and is rarely to be inferred as a matter of law. It should
clearly be made to appear by the evidence, and the best evidence of
intention is to be found in the language used by the parties, though it
may appear in their conduct. The true inquiry is what was done, said
or written, and whether it indicated the alleged intention.106
The second-level approach is characterized by the rebuttable pre-
sumption. If the party alleging fraud can show a certain quantum of
facts and circumstances suggestive of a fraudulent intention on the part
of the grantor, there arises a rebuttable presumption that the convey-
ance was made fraudulently. To raise such a presumption, an attacking
party will ordinarily attempt to show circumstances or facts that arouse
suspicion as to the bona fides of the transaction. These circumstances
are commonly referred to as "badges of fraud."' 7 Badges of fraud have
been described as facts that are "calculated to throw suspicion on the
transaction, and call for explanation."'' 0 8 No single badge of fraud by
itself will raise the presumption, but proof of certain combinations of
different badges of fraud may do so. 109
As to what combination of circumstances will raise this presump-
tion, there is no well-formulated rule in North Carolina. One crucial
factor is the relationship of the parties. Although the mere relationship
of husband and wife by itself is not sufficient, when this factor is coupled
with other circumstances the presumption may arise."' For example, a
conveyance by an insolvent father to his son is presumed to have been
made with fraudulent intent."2 North Carolina courts also have tradi-
"'Danville Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Gallivan Bldg. Co., 177 N.C. 103, 107, 97 S.E. 718, 720
(1919).
"'The notion of "badges of fraud" is said to have originated with the early common law
decision in Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601). See generally J. HANNA & J.
MACHLACHLAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CREDITORS RIGHTS 144-52 (5th ed. 1957).
'0 'Peebles v. Horton, 64 N.C. 374, 377 (1870).
0 'Brown v. Mitchell, 102 N.C. 347, 368-70, 9 S.E. 702, 703-04 (1889).
"'Sanford, Chamberlain, & Albers Co. v. Eubanks, 152 N.C. 697, 699, 68 S.E. 219, 221
(1910).
"'Peeler v. Peeler, 109 N.C. 628, 631, 14 S.E. 59, 61-62 (1891).
"2Unaka & City Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 201 N.C. 148, 155, 159 S.E. 312, 317 (1931).
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tionally regarded any retention of possession by a vendor after sale as
a highly suspicious circumstance." 3 Another factor looked to is
whether the transaction was conducted in secret. Thus, a conveyance in
secret by an insolvent debtor to a near relative has been held to be
presumptively fraudulent." '4 The mere fact of a private sale, however,
has been held to be only evidence of fraudulent intention."' The basis
for the presumption seems to be that the circumstances shown indicate
a peculiar knowledge on the part of parties to the transaction, so that
if they fail to come forward with rebutting evidence explaining their
good faith the transaction will be voided."6
If the presumption arises and the jury believes the attacking party's
evidence, fraudulent intent must be found in the absence of sufficient
rebutting evidence regarding the bona fides of the transaction)" To
rebut the presumption of fraud, it is usually necessary for the parties to
the transaction to take the witness stand and explain the suspicious
circumstances that form the basis of the presumption. If the jury be-
lieves the rebutting witnesses' testimony the presumption is deemed
rebutted and the matter of fraudulent intent becomes purely a factual
question for the jury.' The effect of rebuttal is to downgrade facts or
suspicious circumstances that have formed the basis of the presumption
to mere badges of fraud that are only strong evidence of the fraud, which
must be affirmatively proved." 9
The third level of proving fraudulent intent in North Carolina is
quite similar to the second in that the party attacking the conveyance
"3 Messick v. Fries, 128 N.C. 450, 451, 39 S.E. 59, 60 (1901). See also Piedmont Say. Bank
v. Levy, 138 N.C. 274, 50 S.E. 657 (1905). However, under the Uniform Commercial Code certain
types of transactions are declared to be nonfraudulent even though possession is retained by a seller
or other debtor. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-402(2) (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-305 (1968).
"'Reiger v. Davis, 67 N.C. 185 (1872).
"'Burgin v. Burgin, 23 N.C. 453, 459 (1841).
"'Helms v. Green, 105 N.C. 251, 265, 11 S.E. 470, 474-75 (1890).
"7Redmond v. Chandley, 119 N.C. 575, 578, 26 S.E. 255, 256 (1896).
"id. at 578-79, 26 S.E. at 256-57. For cases in which the presumption was found to be
rebutted, see Young v. Booe, 33 N.C. 347 (1850); Lee v. Flannigan, 29 N.C. 741 (1847). For cases
in which the presumption was found not to have been rebutted, see Morris Plan Bank v. Cook, 55
F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1932); Blanton Grocery v. Taylor, 162 N.C. 307, 78 S.E. 276 (1913). The case
of Peeler v. Peeler, 109 N.C. 628, 14 S.E. 59 (1891), illustrates the shifting of burdens of proof
that occurs in cases of this nature. There the fact of an insolvent debtor conveying land to his wife
was said to raise a presumptionof fraud. However, once the wife had shown to the satisfaction of
the jury that valuable consideration had passed, the presumption was deemed to-have been rebutted
and the burden shifted again to the party attacking the conveyance to prove actual fraud. Id. at
631, 14 S.E. at 61-62. See also Eddleman v. Lentz, 158 N.C. 65, 72 S.E. 1011 (1911).
'Helms v. Green, 105 N.C. 251, 263-64, 11 S.E. 470, 474 (1890).
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must present evidence of the circumstances surrounding the transaction
and satisfy the jury that the transaction was not conducted in good faith.
However, at the third level the attacking party has a clear burden of
proof to sustain and no presumption upon which to rely. One court has
suggested in dictum that there is little difference between saying that a
presumption did not arise and saying that a presumption arose but was
rebutted. '2 There is an element of truth in this observation. At both the
second and third levels of proving actual fraud in North Carolina badges
of fraud are relied on. At the second level, however, only certain badges
in combination will raise a presumption of fraud. These particular
badges of fraud include secrecy, retention of possession, family relation-
ship, and insolvency. At the third level these badges and many others
are utilized as strong evidence from which a jury can draw an inference
of fraud. Other suspicious circumstances that are treated as badges of
fraud include gross inadequacy of consideration, 21 delay in registration
of a deed,' 22 extension of credit to a financially pressed debtor,'2 and
pendency of a lawsuit at the time of transfer. 2 1 In addition, the judge
can comment to the jury upon the suspiciousness of a refusal to testify
by a party with peculiar knowledge of the transaction in issue. 25
Questions of fraudulent intent frequently arise where a debtor con-
fers a preference on some of his creditors by making a conveyance to
the satisfaction of some claimants and to the exclusion of others. It is
well established in North Carolina and other jurisdictions that a debtor
has a right to discharge his honest debts through such a transfer, and
the mere fact that a preference has been conferred is not a badge of
fraud that will get an attacking creditor to a jury on the issue of fraudu-
lent intent.1 2 1 But if the debtor reserved any benefit for himself or if the
jury finds that the purpose of either the debtor or a participating credi-
tor was other than that of satisfying the claims of preferred creditors,
the transfer is void as against all creditors.'2
Thus, in most instances a jury will look at evidence concerning the
'0Kreth v. Rogers, 101 N.C. 269, 270, 7 S.E. 682, 684 (1888).
' 2 Jessup v. Johnston, 48 N.C. 335 (1856).
'Redmond v. Chandley, 119 N.C. 575, 579, 26 S.E. 255, 257 (1896).
1'd.
124Helms v. Green, 105 N.C. 251, 11 S.E. 470 1890).
' Peebles v. Horton, 64 N.C. 374, 377 (1870).
12 1Barber v. Buffaloe, Ill N.C. 206, 213, 16 S.E. 386, 387 (1892).
'"Hafner v. Irwin, 23 N.C. 490, 497-98 (1841). Statements of the Hafner court indicate that
in cases involving preferences the question of fraudulent intent is almost exclusively a subjective
inquiry. Id. at 498.
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relation of the parties, the nature of the transaction, the financial condi-
tion of the transferor, and other circumstances existent at the time of
the transfer in question. But evidence of the subsequent actions of the
parties is also important in determining if their intent at the time of the
conveyance was fraudulent. For example, a voluntary conveyance by an
indebted father to his son is a badge of fraud. But if the father remains
solvent or pays all his debts, any inference of an intention to defeat his
creditors is destroyed. 8 Conversely, if the father in this example after-
wards became insolvent or failed to pay his debts, fraud would likely
be imputed to the earlier transaction.' Along this same line, where a
debtor who executes a deed to his creditor in purported payment of a
debt is allowed to remain on the land and consume any crops grown
thereon without further payment, there is strong evidence of fraud in the
execution of the deed. 30
Under section seven of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,
all conveyances made and obligations "incurred with actual intent, as
distinguished from intent presumed in law," to defraud are fraudu-
lent.'3 ' Sections four, five, and six of the Uniform Act each in effect
declare that fraud will be conclusively presumed under certain condi-
tions without proof of actual fraud. 3 1 It would seem from the language
of section seven and the general approach of the other invalidating
provisions that neither conclusive nor rebuttable presumptions could be
relied on to establish actual fraud in jurisdictions that have adopted the
Uniform Act. In other words, in a Uniform Act jurisdiction an attack-
ing party could proceed only on the third of the three levels of proof
available to his counterpart in North Carolina on the issue of actual
fraud. Such a party would have to satisfy the jury that by the weight of
the evidence there was actual fraud before he could invoke section seven.
Some courts, however, have read the Uniform Act as destroying only
the use of conclusive presumptions in proving actual fraud and have
continued to apply rebuttable or prima facie presumptions as is done in
North Carolina. The result, according to one commentator, has been a
serious lack of uniformity, which the Uniform Act was designed to
provide. 33
118Smith v. Reavis, 29 N.C. 341, 343 (1847). See also Halcombe v. Ray, 23 N.C. 340 (1840).
12'Smith v. Reavis, 29 N.C. 341, 343 (1847).
110Burgin v. Burgin, 23 N.C. 453 (1841).
13 1UFCA § 7 (emphasis added).
122See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
'2See McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 46 HIARV, L.




"If the conveyance is upon a valuable consideration and made with
the actual intent to defraud creditors upon the part of the grantor alone,
not participated in by the grantee and of which intent he had no notice,
it is valid."'34
The preceding three sections have been concerned only with con-
veyances that were not made for valuable consideration. When a con-
veyance is shown to have been made for valuable consideration, the
party attacking the conveyance may be faced with additional problems
in seeking to reach the property transferred. First, under Section 39-19
he will be unable to reach the property if title is in the hands of a bona
fide purchaser. Secondly, he must prove not only that the grantor had
actual fraudulent intent but also that the grantee either participated in
or had notice of the fraud.
In North Carolina, section 39-19 protects bona fide purchasers of
fraudulently conveyed property. The statute provides: "Nothing con-
tained in the preceding sections shall be construed to impeach or make
void any conveyance, interest, limitation of use or uses, of or in any
lands or tenements, goods or chattels, bona fide made, upon and for
good consideration, to any person not having notice of such fraud."'35
Under section 39-19, if a purchaser can establish that he paid good
consideration and that he lacked notice of any fraud, his title even to
goods fraudulently conveyed is absolutely protected. Expressed other-
wise, section 39-19 operates as a qualification to any Elizabethan statu-
tory provisions or judicial presumptions that would otherwise invalidate
a conveyance for fraud.' '6 The scope of protection afforded a bona fide
purchaser has been articulated as follows by the North Carolina Su-
preme Court:
The proviso can only be made operative by giving to it the scope and
effect of purging the original conveyance of the fraud with which it was
tainted, by allowing the bonafides and the full valuable consideration
of the second conveyance to supply the want of these qualities in the
first, so as to perfect the title of the first purchase from being im-
peached and made void.'37
The requisite element of good or valuable consideration has been
'165 N.C. at 227, 81 S.E. at 164 (emphasis added).
m N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-19 (1966).
'Young v. Lathrop, 67 N.C. 63, 72 (1872).
1371d.
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discussed previously.18 Regarding lack of notice, the second element
that is necessary for bona fide purchaser status, some other jurisdictions
with Elizabethan-type statutes place the burden of proof on the party
attacking a conveyance to show that a defendant-purchaser had notice
once the latter has established that he paid valuable consideration. The
rule in North Carolina, however, is that the burden of proof as to both
valuable consideration and lack of notice is on the party seeking to
uphold the transfer. This was established in Cox v. Wall"'3 after some
confusion in earlier case law.
The difficulty in proving lack of notice led Justice Robert M. Doug-
las in Cox v. Wall to dissent:
The mere fact that a fair price is paid is in itself the strongest evidence
of good faith. It may be said that the vendee knows whether or not he
knew of the vendor's fraudulent intent, and that he can disprove such
knowledge by his testimony. This is the only way such a negative can
be proved; but is it any easier for the vendee to prove his want of
knowledge than for the plaintiff to prove his knowledge? That the
vendee had knowledge might be proved by one witness, but a thousand
witnesses could not prove that he had no knowledge. All that they
could prove would be that they did not give him any information to
put him on notice, and that he had no knowledge as far as they knew.""
Despite the Cox v. Wall majority's holding on the burden of proof for
the issue of lack of notice, the North Carolina Supreme Court through
its practice of favorably receiving testimony of putative bona fide pur-
chasers as to their good faith in essence has come to place a de facto
burden of showing lack of notice upon the party who is attacking a
conveyance or asserting that his claim is superior to that of the pur-
chaser. In fact, apparently no other reported cases in North Carolina
discuss the concept of "lack of notice." Instead, the cases involving a
bona fide purchaser claim invariably focus on what constitutes "notice."
A purchaser will be denied the protection of section 39-19 if he is
"ASee text accompanying notes 26-52 supra for a discussion of the concept of valuable
consideration.
131132 N.C. 730, 44 S.E. 635 (1903); accord, Saunders v. Lee, 101 N.C. 3, 7 S.E. 590 (1888).
The latter case distinguishes the situation in which a party attacking a conveyance is attempting
to show that the grantee participated in the fraud or had notice of the fraud and the situation in
which a purchaser is trying to assert the superiority of his title as a bona fide purchaser. In the
former situation, the attacking party has the burden of proof on the issue of notice. In the latter
situation the purchaser must show lack of notice. Id. at 6-7, 7 S.E. at 592.
140132 N.C. at 742, 44 S.E. at 639 (emphasis in original).
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found to have had either actual or constructive notice of the grantor's
fraud. Frequently the line of demarcation between actual and construc-
tive notice is not clear, but the effect of denying the protection of the
statute to a purchaser is the same. 4' Generally, actual notice consists
of actual knowledge of or participation in the fraudulent intentions of
a grantor. Direct evidence that a purchaser knew that a debtor was
making a conveyance to him in fraud of creditors or that the purchaser
in any way assisted the grantor in an attempt to defraud creditors would
of course preclude a purchaser from asserting that he lacked notice.
Such direct evidence is not always available, however.
Proof that a purchaser had notice can also be made constructively.
Constructive notice may be found where facts should have led the trans-
feree to inquire as to the bona fides of a transaction.42 A vendee is
charged with knowledge of facts recited in his deed, and if the deed is
fraudulent on its face, the vendee will be regarded as having shared in
the fraud.' Moreover, where a vendee knows of a prior transfer by a
debtor to the vendee's immediate vendor, the vendee will be charged
with notice of any fraudulent intent apparent on the face of the first
deed.' 4' If a party purchases from a vendor with the knowledge that
another is in possession, he is deemed to have notice of such facts as a
reasonable inquiry into the vendor's title would disclose.4 5 But knowl-
edge of circumstances indicating fraud on the part of a grantor will not
be imputed to a grantee simply because she is the grantor's wife.' Prior
registration of a deed or other instrument affords notice as to all matters
"'Arrington v. Arrington, 114 N.C. 151, 163, 19 S.E. 351, 355 (1894).
"'Cansler v. Cobb, 77 N.C. 30 (1877). In this case the court gave the following example of
facts that constitute constructive notice:
[Suppose] A says to B, "I find I owe more than I can pay. My object is to get money
and go to Texas. You can have my land for a fair price in cash." B agrees to buy the
land and pays the money. The creditors can take the land from B on the ground that
although he purchased at a fair price yet he had notice. True, B had no actual intent to
defraud the creditors of A. His purpose was to buy the land. Still he had notice that the
intent of A was to defraud creditors, and such notice fixes on him a constructive intent.
Id. at 33-34 (emphasis by the court). This quotation reflects the North Carolina court's practice
of failing to distinguish constructive notice, which will defeat a bona fide purchaser claim, and
constructive intent on the part of a grantee, which must be proven before a creditor can void a
transaction in which valuable consideration has passed. For discussion on the requirement of
mutuality of fraudulent intention, see notes 151-54 and accompanying text infra.
"'Cf. Eigenbrun v. Smith, 98 N.C. 207, 209, 4 S.E.122, 123 (1887).
1"d. at 212, 4 S.E. at 124-25.
"'Bost v. Setzer, 87 N.C. 187, 190 (1882).
"'Sanford, Chamberlain & Albers Co. v. Eubanks, 152 N.C. 697, 699,68 S.E. 219,221 (1910).
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that could be discovered by reasonable inquiry, and a is pendens serves
as constructive notice where the "claim is contra or in derogation of the
record."' 47
Under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, a bona fide pur-
chaser receives the same protection that he would in North Carolina.
Section 9(1) of the Uniform Act provides that a creditor against whom
a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent has certain remedies, except as
against "a purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge of the
fraud at the time of the purchase, or one who has derived title immedi-
ately or mediately from such a purchaser.""'4 The language of section
9(1) apparently places the burden of proving fair consideration as de-
fined by section three of the Act upon the putative bona fide purchaser,
as is the case in North Carolina. Under section 9(2) of the Uniform Act,
a purchaser may be protected to the extent of the consideration he paid
even though it has been determined that he paid less than a fair consider-
ation if he did not share in the grantor's actual fraudulent intent. Some
North Carolina authority affords similar protection to the purchaser in
that situation.'
'50
Closely related to the problem of notice in a bona fide purchaser
context is the problem of mutuality of fraudulent intention. Where a
transfer was for valuable consideration, an attacking party must show
not only that the debtor-grantor had actual fraudulent intent but also
that the grantee either had knowledge of such intent or participated in
the fraud.'' Such a requirement of mutuality of fraudulent intention can
be regarded as an essential element in proving actual fraud. It is clear
that if a party attacking a conveyance fails to introduce evidence of a
grantee's lack of good faith-in other words, evidence of the grantee's
participation in or knowledge of the grantor's fraud-he is subject to
nonsuit.12
"TMassachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Knox, 220 N.C. 725, 728, 18 S.E.2d 436, 439 (1941).
But where a grantee has no notice other than a lis pendens filed prior to a creditors' complaint, he
has no notice that would prevent him from establishing that he is a bona fide purchaser. Morgan
v. Bostic, 132 N.C. 743, 754, 44 S.E. 639, 642 (1903). For a case that construes the Registration
Acts with section 39-16 and the latter's requirements of full value and lack of notice, see Austin v.
Staten, 126 N.C. 783, 36 S.E. 338 (1900).
1"UFCA § 9(l), quoted in text- accompanying note 159 infra.
IIIUFCA § 9(2) provides that "a purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent has given
less than a fair consideration for the conveyance or obligation, may retain the property or obliga-
tion as security for repayment."
'-5See note 50 supra.
1'5 Bunn v. Harris, 216 N.C. 366, 5 S.E.2d 149 (1939); Aman v. Walker, 165 N.C. 224, 227-
28, 81 S.E. 162, 164 (1914).
152Murphy v. Hacker, 265 N.C. 448, 449, 144 S.E.2d 260, 261 (1965).
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Some Elizabethan jurisdictions require proof of actual knowledge
or actual participation by the grantee to prove mutuality of fraudulent
intention and refuse to impute knowledge from purely circumstantial
evidence.'-" It is not settled in North Carolina whether mere proof of
circumstances putting a grantee on notice as to his grantor's intent is
sufficient. Probably it will suffice to prove facts putting a grantee on
notice or constructive knowledge. Reported cases reflect the North Car-
olina court's failure to distinguish the notice issues with respect to
mutuality of fraudulent intention and regarding the status of a putative
bona fide purchaser.'54 Such a failure suggests that constructive knowl-
edge of fraud may be shown on the former as well as the latter question.
Under section seven of the Uniform Act, as noted before, actual fraud
must be proven; therefore, if mutuality of fraudulent intention is an
essential element of actual fraud in a particular jurisdiction, the same
would be true under the Uniform Act.
PRINCIPLE FIVE
"If the conveyance is upon a valuable consideration, but made with
the actual intent to defraud creditors on the part of the grantor, partici-
pated in by the grantee or of which he had notice, it is void."'55
The fifth principle of Aman v. Walker restates what has been dis-
cussed in the immediately preceding section. A conveyance made for
valuable consideration is void if it can be established that the grantor
acted with the intent to defraud his creditors or purchasers and that his
grantee shared in the fraudulent intent either directly as a participant
or constructively as one with notice. This statement, however, must be
qualified in several ways. First, despite the clear language of sections
39-15111 and 39-16,157 a fraudulent conveyance is not void, but merely
voidable. A conveyance is good as between the parties, and only a
creditor or purchaser who has been defrauded can impeach the convey-
ance."'58 Secondly, it must be remembered that the interest of any bona
1137 AM. JUR. 2d Fraudulent Conveyances § 6 (1968) and authorities cited therein.
"'See note 142 supra. See also Eigenbrun v. Smith, 98 N.C. 207, 4 S.E. 122 (1887); Reiger v.
Davis, 67 N.C. 185 (1872).
1'165 N.C. at 227-28, 81 S.E. at 164 (emphasis added).
'"See note 5 supra.
"'See note 8 supra.
"'Lane v. Becton, 225 N.C. 457, 461, 35 S.E.2d 334, 336 (1945). But note that a court may
refuse to enforce as between parties in pad delicto a transfer such as a bond executed for the
purpose of defrauding creditors, as distinguished from an executed conveyance such as a deed to
land, which does not need the act of a court to give it effect. Powell & Co. v. Inman, 53 N.C. 436,
438-39 (1862).
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fide purchaser will always be protected whether the ground upon which
a conveyance is voidable is actual or presumptive fraud.
REMEDIES OF THE DEFRAUDED CREDITOR
When a conveyance is void as to a creditor upon grounds of either
actual or presumptive fraud, what remedies does a creditor have? Sec-
tion 9(1) of the Uniform Act provides a creditor whose claim has ma-
tured with two alternatives:
Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor, such
creditor, when his claim has matured, may, as against any person
except a purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge of the
fraud at the time of the purchase, or one who has derived title immedi-
ately or mediately from such a purchaser,
(a) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled to the extent
necessary to satisfy his claim, or
(b) Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution upon the
property conveyed.'59
Section 9(1) accurately states the remedies that are available to the
defrauded creditor in North Carolina. It is not necessary for a creditor
in North Carolina to obtain a judgment on his claim before seeking to
set aside a fraudulent conveyance in equity.6 0 The creditor can elect to
seek to set aside a transfer and in the same action establish his own
claim as well as subject the property conveyed to sale under decree of
court for the satisfaction of his claim. 6' Such a suit is in the nature of
a general creditor's bill and if successful will have the effect of voiding
a conveyance as to the creditors of a grantor. A creditor can also elect
to treat the fraudulent conveyance as void and, after obtaining a judg-
ment on his claim, levy upon the property and have it sold under execu-
tion. 6 2 The latter course of action leaves undecided the question of
whether a conveyance was fraudulent; but if in a subsequent separate
action the conveyance is held not fraudulent, the creditor may be held
liable for substantial damages.
6 3
1'5 UFCA § 9(l).
'tDawson Bank v. Harris, 84 N.C. 206 (1881).
'6'Armstrong Grocery Co. v. Banks, 185 N.C. 149, 152, 116 S.E. 171, 173 (1923). It should
be observed, however, that a prior judgment upon claims of creditors is not necessary where all
creditors join in a suit to subject to the payment of their claims property conveyed fraudulently by
the debtor. Mebane v. Layton, 86 N.C. 571 (1882).
'Thigpen v. Pitt, 54 N.C. 49 (1853). This case discusses at length the various remedies
available tb defrauded creditors in North Carolina. Cf. UFCA §§ 9(l), 10.




The following chart summarizes the five principles of Aman v.
Walker"6 4 and the law of fraudulent conveyances as it has developed in
North Carolina.
Nature of Debtor's Debtor's Transferee's Purchaser- Validity
Conveyance"' Financial Intention"' Notice or Defendant of
Condition"' Participation"' Status"' Conveyance
voluntary solvent non- - - valid
fraudulent




voluntary solvent fraudulent none non-BFP to all
creditors
for valuable - fraudulent none - valid
consideration
invalid as
for valuable - fraudulent yes non-BFP to all
consideration creditors
It should be observed that if the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act were adopted in North Carolina, the above chart would continue
to represent the law of fraudulent conveyances in this jurisdiction. Both
the Uniform Act and the Elizabethan-type statutes are designed to pro-
tect creditors against the fraud of their debtors, and this common policy
dictates that with few exceptions similar results be reached with respect
to similar factual patterns.
Although the Uniform Act purports to offer a much less tortuous
route to reaching these results, its attempts to define such troublesome
concepts as "insolvency" and "fair consideration" present at best only
6165 N.C. 224, 81 S.E. 162 (1914). A dash ("-") in the chart denotes that the particular
factor is of no consequence and will not affect the validity of the conveyance.
"6See text accompanying notes 26-52 supra.
"'See text accompanying notes 61-74 supra.
"'See text accompanying notes 93-133 supra.
'"See text accompanying notes 151-54 supra.
"'See text accompanying notes 135-47 supra.
"'"BFP" means bona fide purchaser. A "non-BFP" is a purchaser who either did not pay
good consideration or had notice of the grantor's fraud. See text accompanying notes 132-44 supra.
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a slightly preferable substantive alternative to the present case-by-case
definitional approach in North Carolina. Nevertheless, adoption of the
Uniform Act would on the whole substitute clear, relatively simple
statutory provisions for the complex, confusing, and sometimes strained
interpretations of the present North Carolina statutes. Perhaps the main
effect of adoption would be to eliminate the procedural conundrum that
now faces a creditor seeking to prove actual fraud on the part of his
debtor. This prospect alone makes the Uniform Act deserving of legisla-
tive consideration by the North Carolina General Assembly.
E. CADER HOWARD
